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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
This section of the annual Tenth Circuit survey encompasses
the interrelated areas of property, public lands, natural resources,
and the environment. The continuing tension between develop-
ment of western energy sources and environmental concerns, cou-
pled with the high incidence of public ownership of land in the
states which make up the Tenth Circuit, suggests that this topic
will be the subject of increasing judicial activity in the coming
years.
In Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,' the
Tenth Circuit considered one of the numerous problems created
by severance of the mineral from the surface estate of federal
lands. This decision, which affirmed the district court's holding
that a mineral estate leased from the United States is dominant
and uncondemnable by the owner of a servient surface estate
subsequently created by the Federal Government, is analyzed
more extensively below. In the second comment of this section
three decisions of the Tenth Circuit involving the procedures of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) are examined as
a basis for consistent interpretation of that statute's require-
ments.' Finally, three less significant issues relating to lands and
natural resources which were decided by the Tenth Circuit last
term are noted here briefly.
A. Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th
Cir. 1973)
The Citizens Environmental Council brought this action to
enjoin a federally-assisted highway construction project. The pri-
mary issue concerned the adequacy of the environmental impact
statement (EIS) prepared pursuant to the requirements of
NEPA.3 Plaintiffs claimed that the impact statement was inade-
quate because: (1) it was prepared by the Kansas State Highway
Commission instead of the United States Department of Trans-
portation; and (2) it did not detail alternative routes.
In denying plaintiffs' appeal from a summary judgment, the
492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. July
2, 1974) (No. 73-1943).
' Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974); National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974);
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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Tenth Circuit cited Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v.
Volpe4 for the proposition that NEPA's requirements are met
when a state agency prepares an EIS in consultation with other
state, federal, and private agencies and the responsible federal
official does not merely rubberstamp the EIS, but reviews it and
adopts it as his own.' Had the court desired to use it, authority
existed for a broader statement of the same rule.'
As to the contention that alternative routes were not ana-
lyzed, the court found that the consideration given was sufficient
to meet NEPA's requirements.7 Although not stated in the opin-
ion, it seems obvious that the court saw little difference between
the various possible routes. Consequently, "an exhaustive, pain-
staking and extensive report of the environmental effects of alter-
natives" was not necessary for a "reasoned choice."' This ap-
proach foreshadows the "rule of reason" enunciated in National
Helium Corp. v. Morton9 where the Tenth Circuit indicated that
it would search for a reasonable, good faith effort to prepare an
EIS adequate as a basis for an agency's substantive decision.' 0
B. Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974)
Trespass to airspace was the cause of action considered by
the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of Sandia." The modern trend, which
was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1946 decision,
United States v. Causby,2 distinguishes between trespass to air-
space and common trespass to realty. 3 Essentially, trespass to
airspace requires more than interference with bare possessory
rights; there must also be a showing of direct and immediate
interference with the actual use and enjoyment of land.
' 355 F. Supp. 933, 938 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd sub nom., Finish Allatoona's Interstate
Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973).
355 F. Supp. at 938.
It has been held that NEPA does not require that the EIS be prepared by a federal
official and that development of an EIS by a state agency is not violative of either the
spirit or mandate of NEPA, National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp.
123, 127 (D. Mont. 1972).
484 F.2d at 873.
'Id.
486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974).
Id. at 1002.
497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974).
12 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
13 Id.
" See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Speir v. United States, 485
F.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750
(D.N.J. 1958).
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Even though most of the flights operating out of Smith's
airport crossed Pueblo of Sandia's boundary line at heights of 150
feet or less, the court refused to reverse the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Smith because the nearest improvement on
the Pueblo of Sandia's land was 5.4 miles from the boundary line
adjoining Smith's runway. Moreover, the intervening land was
uninhabited and, in fact, was used for no purpose whatsoever.
Consequently, "[t]he complaint did not allege, and the accom-
panying affidavits did not show, a substantial interference with
the actual use of appellant's land."'"
Further, Pueblo of Sandia's allegation of a decreased market
value for potential commercial development as an element of
damages was rejected. The court held "that low level flights must
be a direct, immediate and present cause of injury, and not spec-
ulative or a mere possibility."'"
C. Upper Pecos Association v. Stans, 500 F.2d 17 (10th Cir.
1974)
The Economic Development Agency (EDA), an agency
within the Department of Commerce, offered a grant of nearly $4
million to a New Mexico county commission for construction and
surfacing of 33.3 miles of roadway. The offer was made prior to
the preparation of an EIS. Plaintiff conservationists sought to
enjoin construction of the road.
After a labyrinthine trip through the federal judicial sys-
tem, 7 only one issue was finally presented to the Tenth Circuit
for review-whether or not the EDA was so deeply committed to
the project after making the initial offer that subsequent prepara-
tion of an objective EIS was precluded.
497 F.2d at 1045.
' Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
" The action was originally brought in January 1971, before any EIS had been writ-
ten. NEPA requires preparation of an EIS when "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment" are contemplated. Before trial, the U.S.
Forest Service prepared an EIS. The district court held that the Forest Service was the
"head agency" and consequently had primary responsibility for development of the EIS.
Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332, 335 (D.N.M. 1971), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1233
(10th Cir. 1972). EDA was, therefore, not required to prepare an EIS. The Supreme Court,
however, granted certiorari on the question, Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Peterson, 406 U.S. 944
(1972), after which EDA, for reasons unstated, prepared an additional EIS. The Supreme
Court then remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to determine whether the issue of
EDA's preparation of an EIS had become moot. 409 U.S. 1021 (1972). The Tenth Circuit
in turn remanded the case to the trial court where it was determined that the issue was
moot. An appeal was taken.
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The point at which an EIS "tends to serve as a post facto
justification of decisions based on traditional and narrow
grounds"'" is primarily a factual determination. In the instant
case, the Tenth Circuit held that the critical stage had not been
reached and that the EIS was timely prepared.'9 The mere offer
by EDA did not constitute a commitment by the agency that
would prevent objective reconsideration of the project during
preparation of the EIS.
By finding the EIS to have been properly, although some-
what belatedly, prepared, the court effectively mooted plaintiffs'
environmental challenge.
I. MINERAL ESTATE LEASED FROM THE UNITED STATES HELD
DOMINANT AND UNCONDEMNABLE BY THE OWNER OF THE SERVIENT
SURFACE ESTATE SUBSEQUENTLY CREATED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974)
By DON H. SHERWOOD*
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.' illustrates
one of the many problems generated by the severance of federal
title to the public domain into mineral and surface2 estates.' In
, 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 246 (1972).
g In so deciding, the court relied partly on Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information,
Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where it was stated that:
Statements must be written late enough in the development process to con-
tain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough so that
whatever information is contained can practically serve as an input into the
decision making process.
Id. at 1094. The initial and primary responsibility for striking the balance between com-
peting factors rests with the agency.
*Member of the Firm, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; Ad-
junct Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.S., 1960; J.D., 1961,
University of Nebraska.
' 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g an unpublished decision of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico, petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001, (U.S. June
27, 1974) (No. 73-1943).
2 It is convenient to call the fee-less-mineral estate a "surface estate," but this is a
misnomer. See, e.g., United States v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Calif. 1973)
(distinguishing fee title, subject to a reservation of minerals, from surface estate); State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
1 The problems were recognized in PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF
THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESs 136-38 (1970), which
said:
There are over 62 million acres of land, the surface of which is in non-Federal
ownership, in which the Federal Government holds reserved mineral inter-
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this instance, the United States, in 1954, leased the right to mine
potash on certain lands in New Mexico to one company, reserving
surface rights-insofar as not interfering with the use of the land
by the lessee in mining potash 4-and then in 1959, the United
States granted a right-of-way across the same lands to another
company for a pipeline and compressor station site, "subject to
all valid existing rights."'
The pipeline company, Transwestern, was fully aware of the
prior rights of Kerr-McGee, the mining company, and knew that
mining could damage or destroy its compressor station, but it
nonetheless built the pipeline and station, putting its facilities
into operation in 1960 under a certificate of public convenience
and necessity issued by the Federal Power Commission! To but-
tress its rights in its compressor station site,' Transwestern ob-
tained a patent to that land in 1962. The United States, however,
reserved the minerals in the land patented, together with the
right to prospect for, mine, and remove the minerals.' Further-
more, the patent was issued subject to the rights of prior permit-
tees or lessees to use so much of the surface of the lands as is
required for mining operations, without compensation to the pa-
tentee for damages resulting from proper mining operations.9
ests. . . .Present law is totally inadequate to provide proper consideration
of the legitimate interests of surface owners.
Conflicting views exist as to the means appropriate to resolution of the problems. Compare
Sherwood, Mining Law at the Crossroads, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 161, 167-69 (1970);
with Carpenter, Severed Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Development, 51 DENVER L.J. 1
(1974); Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy
the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 411 (1974); Hawley,
Problems of Surface Damage, 33 DICTA 115 (1956); Note, Surface Damages from Strip
Mining Under the Stock Raising Homestead Act, 50 DENVER L.J. 369 (1973); Note,
Protection for Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L.
REv. 171 (1973).
See 30 U.S.C. §§ 186, 285 (1970).
492 F.2d at 880.
Id. The mining lease and the right-of-way were issued by the Bureau of Land
Management, an agency of the Department of the Interior, under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920. Compare 30 U.S.C. §§ 281-85 (1970) (leasing of potash mining rights) with 30
U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (granting of rights-of-way for pipeline purposes). The latter statute
has recently been amended as a result of the Alaska pipeline controversy. Act of Nov. 16,
1973, Pub. L. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 576. Cf. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The Federal Power Commission acted under the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717(a)-(w) (1970).
1 These rights might well have exceeded the rights which the government is author-
ized to grant under 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d
842 (D.C. Cir. 1973), afj'g Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
The patent was probably issued pursuant to an exchange under 43 U.S.C. § 315g
(1970) by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior.
1 492 F.2d at 881-82. It must be emphasized that the situation here described strongly
1975
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Unable to negotiate protection for its facilities with Kerr-
McGee, Transwestern brought this action to prevent Kerr-McGee
from commencing mining operations within the land patented to
it by the United States, arguing that: (1) its pipeline facilities
were entitled to lateral and subjacent support; (2) Kerr-McGee's
mining plan was unlawfully approved by the Government;'" and
(3) it could utilize the power of eminent domain to insure physical
support for its compressor station.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico dismissed all three counts of Transwestern's complaint.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the same
grounds adopted by the trial court, one judge dissenting."
The argument that the Government could not lawfully ap-
prove Kerr-McGee's mining plan because it failed to provide pro-
tection for Transwestern's compressor station was unanimously
rejected by the appellate court, which agreed with the trial court
that the Government was under no obligation to Transwestern
with respect to its consideration of the mining plan.'" As to the
adequacy of the plan itself, which the lower court found to be
proper, the Tenth Circuit treated this as a finding of fact not
clearly erroneous. 3 These conclusions require no discussion if the
Transwestern estate is to be considered servient to the mineral
estate leased by the government to Kerr-McGee.
On this issue, the court of appeals-again, unani-
mously-concluded that Kerr-McGee's leasehold interest ac-
quired under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 constitutes the
dominant estate. The court relied on Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v.
Kieffer 4 for its conclusion that:
Where, as here, the United States reserves the mineral estate, to-
gether with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same in
a grant of the surface estate, there is a servitude laid on the surface
estate for the benefit of the mineral estate .... Kerr-McGee was
favors the mineral lessee. See note 40 infra. In the more usual situation 30 U.S.C. § 186
(1970) is not available to buttress the position of the holder of the mineral title.
See 43 C.F.R. § 23.8 (1973).
The majority opinion is by Barrett, J., with whom Hill, J., joined. Doyle, J.,
dissented, with opinion.
11 492 F.2d at 882. The mining plan required by 43 C.F.R. § 23.8 (1973) is for the
benefit of the government, not the owner of a surface estate which might be affected by
mining thereunder. See 43 C.F.R. § 23.2(b) (1973); but compare The Montana Power Co.,
72 Interior Dec. 518 (1965).
" 492 F.2d at 881-83.
277 U.S. 488 (1928).
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empowered to remove potash, and if necessary, to subside the sur-
face in so doing."
In the circumstances of this case, where Transwestern took its
interest with full knowledge of Kerr-McGee's rights, subject to
express patent provisions in favor of Kerr-McGee, and went
ahead with construction notwithstanding the obvious infirmity in
its position," any other result would negate the terms of the lease
issued to Kerr-McGee, which, after all, was first in time and
therefore first in right.
The court's reliance upon Kinney-Coastal Oil is well placed.
The severed mineral estate must be considered dominant or it
will fail altogether. 7 But this does not mean that the servient
surface estate must fail altogether; the two estates can be harmo-
nized as has occurred in numerous cases. Thus, for example, not
all valuable minerals may be deemed part of the dominant es-
tate;i8 some minerals may be deemed part of the surface itself and
therefore not subject to a servitude in favor of a severed mineral
estate, 9 and some severances may be treated as not having con-
templated surface mining methods.20 But the Government insists
on dominance for its severed mineral estates 2' equal to its sover-
eign powers.2 2 To some extent this attitude is justified because
Congress has generally provided for compensation to the patentee
disturbed in his possession by operations under the mineral inter-
est.2 3 As -in the instant case, the surface owner takes subject to a
known servitude which must affect the consideration paid for
such a title.
24
" 492 F.2d at 882-83.
Id.
Id. at 881-82.
See, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971), discussed in Patton, Recent
Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 RociKY MTN. MIN-
ERAL L. INST. 19 (1973).
" See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d
122 (1971); Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954).
' See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970).
" See, e.g., United States v. Isbell Constr. Co., 4 I.B.L.A. 205, 78 Interior Dec. 385
(1971). In this case, the Department of the Interior concluded that a mineral reservation
by the government applies to the surface material itself even after the surface estate has
been patented by the United States. The decision in Isbell is persuasively criticized in
Carpenter, supra note 3, at 15-16.
2 Of course, the government insists on dominance for its surface estate when the shoe
is on the other foot. See United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.W. Va. 1955)
(Polino reserved minerals from a grant to the United States).
21 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 299, 315g(d) (1970), the former concerning stockraising
homestead patents and the latter exchange patents.
' While this seems obvious in some cases, such as those involving stockraising home-
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Ultimately, then, harmonization or correlation of rights must
come down to compensation for loss of enjoyment of one estate
or the other. But which one? Plainly, the owner of the dominant
estate cannot be required to compensate the owner of the servient
estate. 5 Nothing, however, should prevent compensation of the
owner of the dominant estate by the owner of the servient estate
or by the government through condemnation. In either case, the
counter to dominance should be the power of eminent domain;
the servitude should be defined through just compensation. 6 Un-
fortunately, the Government habitually resists just compensa-
tion 27 and the power of eminent domain is grudgingly given to
individuals.
21
Because Transwestern operates under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and has express statutory authority to
condemn property for right-of-way and compressor station pur-
poses, 21 one would expect Transwestern to prevail on the third
count of its complaint. Clearly, Transwestern would have pre-
vailed if Kerr-McGee had been the lessee of minerals in privately-
owned land.30 This does not mean, however, that the power of
steads, id., it is not always clear that this is so. See, e.g., Withrow, Broad-Form
Deed-Obstacle to Peaceful Coexistence Between Mineral and Surface Owners, 60 Ky.
L.J. 742 (1972).
Such a solution has been suggested. Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Es-
tates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN.
MINERAL L. INST. 411, 435 (1974).
" The point is best illustrated in Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 353
F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), where the court resorted to zoning analogies in an effort to
destroy dominant severed mineral estates but, id. at 710, mentioned, without deciding,
that compensation for the consequences of its decision might be had under the Tucker
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). But see Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 497
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974), reversing the district court on rather narrow procedural grounds.
A few examples should suffice. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488
(1973); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
1 The excuse is that private property should not be condemned for private use. See,
e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14.
2 The statute, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1970), refers to condemnation "of property" for
the purpose of acquiring "the necessary right-of-way ... and the necessary land or other
property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location of compressor stations . The
character of property which can be condemned is neither defined nor limited.
" 492 F.2d at 883: "[A] number of decisions in which holders of certificates of public
convenience and necessity have exercised condemnation powers under Section 717f(h)
[section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act] . . . do not control because each involved the
condemnation of privately owned land" (emphasis by the court). Of course, no one is
suggesting that Transwestern sought the right to mine the mineral estate. Cf. 26 AM. JUR.
2d Eminent Domain § 134 (1966): "[T]he owner [generally] . . . retains general title
to the minerals underlying the land condemned . . . [and] the right to remove them
when he can do so without interfering with the rights of user passing to the condemnor."
VOL. 52
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
eminent domain operates in such a case to convert a servient to
a dominant estate; the dominant estate can, as we have seen, be
enjoyed without obligation to the owner of the servient estate, at
least in the absence of a contractual commitment." The power of
eminent domain is available in the public interest precisely for
that reason. It enables the owner of a servient estate to overcome
the bar of the dominant estate through just compensation.2
Both courts here concluded, however, that the dominant es-
tate was shielded from condemnation by the government's owner-
ship of the minerals leased to Kerr-McGee. They held the United
States an indispensable party and concluded that Transwestern's
complaint in condemnation was an unconsented suit against the
United States.3 To reach this result, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
that Kerr-McGee had given valuable consideration to the United
States for its lease and that the United States, as owner in fee of
the minerals, would be denied its royalties if Transwestern were
allowed-through condemnation-to prohibit exploitation of
those minerals. 4 Holding, then, that the leasehold created by the
United States is a completely dominant estate, 5 the court re-
jected condemnation by the owner of an estate servient thereto
on the ground that the power of eminent domain extends only to
private property and not to lands owned by the United States. 6
The dissent applies to this point alone, arguing that the interest
of the United States is not in controversy-the only real issue
being whether the power to condemn allows the taking, upon just
compensation, of Kerr-McGee's private leasehold interest:37
Unquestionably Kerr-McGee is entitled to just compensation for the
reasonable market value of its leasehold estate-the reasonable
market value, no doubt, of the minerals involved. The government
has no interest in this except to require Kerr-McGee to account to
it for its interest in whatever it receives. 8
" Note, for example, that the use of servient land by the owner of a dominant mineral
estate therein to facilitate mineral production from other lands is wrongful. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, 471 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1973); Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp.,
48 Cal. App. 2d 429, 119 P.2d 973 (1941). But see Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo.
321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955). Cf. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 9, and 30 U.S.C. 124 (1970).
"2 See J. Gerand & R.L. Moran, Development of Federally Reserved Minerals in Fee
Lands in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.51 at 579 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Founda-
tion ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF MINING].
492 F.2d at 883-84.
34 Id.
u Id. at 884.
31 Id. at 883-84.
11 Id. at 884, 885.
31 Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The effect of the rule adopted by the majority in this regard39
is to give the leasehold grant to Kerr-McGee a much greater
quality than the fee surface title granted to Transwestern.4 0 The
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 does give the United States a direct
monetary interest in mineral development, but that fact is not
alone sufficient cause to treat the interest of the mineral lessee
differently than any other private interest in land." The various
Acts of Congress implicitly recognize the rights of both surface-
and mineral-interest owners "to the use of the same tract of land
and afford compensation to the prior possessor whose rights have
been supplanted to an unreasonable extent by the subsequent
use." 42
The condemnation provisions of the Natural Gas Act on
which Transwestern relied43 are not limited, but apply to property
of all kinds. The result reached in Transwestern Pipeline limits
those provisions to private fee-simple absolute titles. If those
provisions do not apply to private leasehold titles to publicly-
owned minerals, then it must follow either that a mineral lease
from the United States is not property or that section 7(h) of the
Natural Gas Act does not mean what it says. As the dissent
correctly points out, the royalty interest of the United States,
which is the only portion of its fee title not held by the private
" The dissent suggests that the majority rule "could seriously curtail the exercise of
the power of eminent domain by pipeline companies" and might place Transwestern in a
position which "may also subject it to hardship greatly disproportionate to the injury
which its pumping station created." Id. at 885-86. Under some conditions, however, the
reverse might be true, as where the necessity to preserve a portion of a surface estate
dictates-perhaps for economic reasons-that there be no mining at all there or in adja-
cent areas as well. Cf., e.g., Bureau of Mines of Maryland v. George's Creek Coal &
Land Co., 321 A.2d 748 (Md. Ct. App. 1974).
0 In this particular case, there is a distinction and the difference is not entirely
without support. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.47 (1960), discussing the specific
statutory and regulatory provisions, 30 U.S.C. § 186 (1970); and 43 C.F.R. §§ 2093.0-3
through 2093.0-6 (Oct. 1, 1973), which applied in this case because the Kerr-McGee lease
was in effect when Transwestern's patent issued.
" Acts of Congress predating the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437
(which provided for leasing rather than sale of severed titles to certain minerals in federal
land), such as the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 864 (especially
section 9 thereof, now 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970)), did not contemplate
that the United States, as owner of reserved minerals, would reap any direct
monetary benefit from the mineral development. We have a situation in
which the sovereign landlord has created two estates in particular tracts of
land, each estate possessed by different persons, and all seeking to exploit
the land under governmental grants of equal quality.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.42 at 562 (1960).
," Id. § 3.50 at 577.
13 See note 29 supra.
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mineral lessee,44 would be completely protected and fully realized
in condemnation proceedings. There is, therefore, no reason to
treat the mineral lessee whose lessor happens to be the Federal
Government any differently than the mineral lessee whose lessor
is the owner of private property. In each case the lessee's interest
is property, and whether or not it should be considered a domi-
nant estate, it should be subject to condemnation exactly as it is
subject to taxation by a state notwithstanding the fact that the
source of the title is the Federal Government.45
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1969 STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973)
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973)
Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker
500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974)
Since the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA), I the federal courts have struggled to define their
role in implementing the Act. Although recognizing that federal
agencies often find their plans frustrated by NEPA's environmen-
tal goals, the courts have nevertheless actively intervened when
procedural compliance with NEPA had been in issue.' In line
with several other jurisdictions, the Tenth Circuit has developed
a broad standard of review applicable to the procedural require-
ments outlined in NEPA,3 while noting that substantive decisions
If anything, condemnation would protect the government's reversionary interest
and prevent waste.
0 There is no question that the federal mineral lessee's interest is property subject
to state taxation. See, e.g., Rummel v. Musgrave, 142 Colo. 249, 350 P.2d 825 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 293 (1960), where the lessee's interest under a United States
uranium mining lease covering Government lands was held property taxable by a state.
Compare Hagood v. Heckers, 513 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1973), and Mesa Verde Co. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 178 Colo. 49, 495 P.2d 229 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972),
with Georgia Pac. Corp. v. County of Mendocino, 357 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1972), recognized that "administrative difficulty does not interpose such flexi-
bility into the requirements of NEPA as to undercut the duty of compliance 'to the fullest
extent possible.'"
' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), which in part provides that all agencies of the Federal
Government shall:
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are still to be reviewed under the much narrower arbitrary and
capricious standard promulgated in section 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1
This comment examines two recent cases where the standard
of review to be accorded NEPA-mandated agency action was in
issue. The Tenth Circuit's approach is then compared to that of
other courts. Finally, a third Tenth Circuit case provides a
springboard for considering the application of this standard to
situations involving agency inaction where NEPA's requirements
are involved.
I. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
Two closely related issues have recently been presented to
the Tenth Circuit: what standard is the court to apply in review-
ing an environmental impact statement (EIS) mandated by
NEPA; and, similarly, what standard is to be applied when an
agency decides that an EIS is not required because the contem-
plated measures are not "major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment." 5 The latter deci-
[Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
For a review of landmark decisions involving close scrutiny of agency procedures man-
dated by this provision see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 16-26 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). This section states that the reviewing court shall
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law ....
The narrow arbitrary and capricious standard of review enunciated in this section is a less
searching test than the broad standard developed for review of issues involving procedural
compliance. The narrower standard allows the agency much discretion. It has been said
that "[aidministrative action may be regarded as arbitrary and capricious only where it
is not supportable on any rational basis." Carlisle Paper Box Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 1, 5
(3d Cir. 1968).
5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). This is probably the most important phrase in
NEPA because proposals for federal action which come within this phrase must be accom-
panied by an EIS. See France, Judicial Review of Threshold Determination of the Applic-
ability of NEPA, 12 LAND & NATURAL REs. Div. J. 37 (1974). The broad statutory language
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sion is referred to as a negative EIS determination.' One standard
has evolved for determining both issues.
In National Helium Corp. v. Morton,7 the Secretary of the
Interior had been enjoined by the district court from terminating
helium purchase contracts entered into pursuant to the Helium
Act.' It had earlier been decided that an EIS was a prerequisite
for terminating the contracts,' and one issue in this action was
whether the resulting EIS fulfilled NEPA's requirements. The
lower court, relying on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,' decided that the proper standard of review was the arbi-
trary and capricious test enunciated in section 706(2)(A) of the
APA."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Overton Park as
a case involving "true" agency action, while preparation of an
EIS is "a prerequisite for agency action but is not agency action
itself."'" The Tenth Circuit seemed to be saying that true agency
action relates to substantive decisions while the issue here con-
cerned procedural compliance. Having freed itself from the ap-
parent confines of the APA, the court fashioned a standard which
allows close scrutiny of an EIS to insure strict and objective good
faith compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements. Finding
support in the District of Columbia Circuit for the proposition
that environmental considerations should bear equal weight with
economic and technical factors,' 3 the Tenth Circuit summarized
the standard as a determination of whether the EIS:
(1) discussed all of the five procedural requirements of NEPA,
of this action-forcing provision has received the most attention in the courts. See F.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 56.
1 Exactly what is required to support a negative EIS determination (sometimes called
a negative threshold determination) is not certain, but more is needed than a statement
by the agency that it need not file an EIS. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334
F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore. 1971). On the other hand, when the record shows a "wide-
ranging and continuing assessment . . . of the potential environmental impact" a court
will find good faith compliance with NEPA and uphold the negative EIS determination.
Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972).
486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974).
50 U.S.C. § 167 (1970).
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1971).
0 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
,I 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
12 486 F.2d at 1001. Since the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), provides judicial review
only for agency action, the Tenth Circuit in calling action under NEPA by another name
has attempted to remove review from the ambit of the APA.
" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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(2) constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the de-
mands of NEPA, and
(3) contains a reasonable discussion of the subject matter involved
in the five required areas."
Applying this "rule of reason,"' 5 the court determined that the
EIS was sufficient.
Less than a month before National Helium, the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz."
There an action was brought for declaratory, injunctive, and
mandamus relief against performance of two contracts entered
into by the Forest Service for the sale of timber. The timber was
located in the Teton National Forest of Wyoming and harvesting
it in accordance with the contracts would have resulted in 46
clearcuts involving about 770 acres. Plaintiff conservationists
thought preparation of an EIS should precede contract perform-
ance, but the Forest Service determined that NEPA did not re-
quire an EIS in this instance. The agency concluded that these
timber sales did not constitute major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.
The court thought this determination was essentially a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation, and decided that, under NEPA's
high standards, 7 an EIS was required. In so doing, it did not
define the key terms "major federal action" and "significantly
affecting," but relied on several earlier cases evidently for the
proposition that determining the outer limits of these broad sta-
tutory terms is to be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.' s Sev-
eral courts have attempted to define these terms, 9 but the defini-
tions themselves are so broad that they offer little guidance.
486 F.2d at 1002-03.
Id. at 1002.
I, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). This section states that compliance with the procedural
requirements shall be "to the fullest extent possible."
" Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970),
afl'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
"1 A "major Federal action" is federal action that requires substantial planning, time,
resources, or expenditure. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp.
356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972). Whether an action will significantly affect the environment
will depend on at least two relevant factors:
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects
in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected by it, and
(2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action
itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to
existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area.
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While deciding that an EIS was a prerequisite for perform-
ance of the contracts, the Tenth Circuit stated a standard of
review of negative EIS determinations similar to that developed
for an EIS in National Helium. Here also the court indicated that
the decision whether or not to prepare an EIS was not true agency
action and not within the agency's discretion. Consequently, the
APA did not control review of a negative EIS determination.,,
Relying in part on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v.
AEC,2 the Tenth Circuit held that a negative EIS determination
would be reviewed under a standard of reasonableness in light of
NEPA's mandatory requirements and high standards in order to
be "in accordance with the law. '2 2 In using this quote from the
APA, the court may have been attempting to bring its standard
within the penumbra of that Act. At least it apparently wished
to refrain from announcing too radical a departure from stan-
dards enunciated therein.
In both National Helium and Wyoming Outdoor, the court
noted that its broad standard of review applied only in determin-
ing if there was compliance with NEPA's procedural require-
ments. Substantive decisions based on strict, good faith compli-
ance remained within the agency's discretion, and would be re-
viewed under the narrower arbitrary and capricious standard of
the APA.
It is suggested that construing agency action relating to
NEPA's procedural requirements as something other than true
agency action constitutes a weak and unnecessary distinction. In
Wyoming Outdoor, the court, in stating its standard, quoted the
APA for the proposition that compliance had to be "in accord-
ance with law."" It is therefore arguable that the legislative in-
tent manifested in this phrase would encompass broad review of
issues raised under NEPA where that Act mandates strict proce-
dural compliance as a prerequisite to substantive decision. It fol-
lows that both the procedural compliance and substantive deci-
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
For a perceptive discussion of Hanly, see Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative
Statement, 53 B.U.L. REv. 879 (1973).
m See text accompanying note 13 supra.
21 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114. See also Save Our
Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v.
Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
n Id.
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sions would constitute true agency action and would be reviewa-
ble under the APA although the respective standards of review
would differ in scope.24
This approach would compare favorably with other jurisdic-
tions where such distinctions were avoided. The Fifth Circuit,
searching for a standard in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger
("SOTA "), 5 treated Overton Park more charitably than did the
Tenth Circuit in National Helium. In SOTA, the court con-
cluded:
Overton Park teaches that a more penetrating inquiry is appropriate
for court-testing the entryway determination of whether all relevant
factors should ever be considered by the agency.2
This rather awkward sentence has been interpreted as providing
authority for a more expansive review under the APA wherever
the pertinent organic statute so dictates. 27 The different stan-
dards applied to review of procedural compliance and substantive
decisionmaking 2s are analogous to the different standards applied
to questions of law and those of fact. The complex issues arising
under NEPA are similar to questions of mixed law and fact. 2 The
21 Authority for different standards can be found in Overton Park where the Court
said inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, but the ultimate standard of
review is a narrow one. 401 U.S. at 413-16. Similarly, under NEPA the test for procedural
compliance is searching and careful, but review of the substantive decisions is narrow.
That the broader review finds its basis in the phrase "in accordance with law" is supported
by the district court's definition of that phrase in Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Ky. 1967), rev'd sub nom., American Commercial Lines, Inc.
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968):
It is not in accordance with the law . . . if it is based upon an erroneous
interpretation or misapplication of relevant statutory provisions.
In reversing, the Supreme Court did not quarrel with this definition.
472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 466.
48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 522, 538 (1973). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
2 The substantive goals of NEPA are stated in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-32 (1970). Other
jurisdictions have concluded that substantive issues raised under NEPA can be tested
against an arbitrary and capricious standard. The proper approach is to determine
whether the agency balanced all relevant factors. Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473
F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d
289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115. One commentator believes the stage is set for a close
scrutiny of substantive as well as procedural issues under NEPA. F. ANDERSON, supra note
3, at 265.
Classifying complex issues as law, fact, or mixed law and fact is difficult, and the
obvious pitfall is that a court will subdivide to its liking and then attach the appropriate
labels. Thus, definitive criteria which would lead to consistency often remain elusive. K.
DAvis, ArwismTRATxiv LAW TEXT § 30.01, at 545 (3d ed. 1972). The same pitfall may await
a court attempting to draw lines between procedural and substantive issues.
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Supreme Court developed a standard for reviewing mixed law
and fact issues in NLRB v. Hearst.3 0 It has been both relied upon
and distinguished in other jurisdictions concerned with NEPA-
related issues,3 ' but it seems that the Tenth Circuit's approach
(minus the distinction between true and other kinds of agency
action) can be reconciled with it.
Both the Hearst Court and the Tenth Circuit dealt with the
specific application of broad statutory terms. Both thought their
standard of review had a basis in reason. The Supreme Court held
that an agency's determination was to be accepted if it had
" 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law. ' 32 Simi-
larly, in both National Helium and Wyoming Outdoor, the Tenth
Circuit, while noting that an agency's substantive decisions
would be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard
of section 706(2)(A) of the APA,13 in essence stated it would ac-
cept the decision if it had a reasonable basis in law predicated on
warrant in the record. But to have warrant in the record under
NEPA, sufficient facts must be developed pursuant to the man-
datory procedures of NEPA: procedural compliance shall be "to
the fullest extent possible. 3 Thus the court will search for strict
procedural compliance to determine if there is warrant in the
record for any substantive decision. Once it finds a record ade-
quate under NEPA, its standard narrows to the arbitrary and
capricious test.
There is, then, ample room within the framework of the APA
for the court to closely scrutinize an EIS or negative EIS determi-
nation for procedural compliance. Such an approach could avoid
potential inconsistency in judicial review and agency administra-
tion which might result from splintering closely related actions
into different categories.
II. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO AGENCY INACTION
Considering the Tenth Circuit's broad standard of review of
agency action taken in compliance with the procedural mandates
of NEPA, is it likely that the same standard will be applied in
determining when agency inaction constitutes a negative EIS de-
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
31 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park
v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972).
11 322 U.S. at 131.
33 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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termination? In Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 5 this
issue was raised but not decided. One contention of the plaintiffs
was that the ongoing operation of the Glen Canyon Dam requires
the preparation of an EIS. Plaintiffs were particularly concerned
with the fluctuations in the discharge of the water below the dam
which endangered their river float trips. The court thought the
issue was substantial, but lacked ripeness because there had been
neither agency action nor a request for such. The opinion indi-
cated that some formalized administrative action would be a
prerequisite for review.
There is good authority, however, for the proposition that
formalized action should not necessarily be a prerequisite; that
agency inaction can, in some instances, be tantamount to nega-
tive agency action. This view was taken by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,31 where
the court concluded:
Clearly relief delayed is not always equivalent to relief denied ....
But when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on
the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude
judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather
than in the form of an order denying relief. 7
The District of Columbia Circuit further stated that meaningful
review would be impossible without some agency action based on
an adequate record. Consequently, the court's role would be to
insure that the agency exercise its discretion within a reasonable
time, and also to insure that the decision finds support in the
record.
That this approach is especially applicable to issues related
to NEPA was noted in Scientists' Institute for Public Informa-
tion, Inc. v. AEC.3 Although recognizing that in the final analysis
agency expertise is necessary to weigh the competing concerns, 31
the court thought that
3 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974).
- 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31 Id. at 1099. In addition, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), was
cited for the general proposition that review of agency action is authorized absent clear
and convincing evidence of legislative intent to preclude review.
38 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3 It has been pointed out that although technical expertise is justification for defer-
ence to an agency, environmental issues should not be reviewed solely in technical terms.
Judges may be in a better position to balance the competing interests than the responsible
agency. 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 522, 539 (1973). But see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert.
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some degree of judicial scrutiny of an agency's decision that the time
is not yet ripe for a NEPA statement is necessary in order to ensure
that the policies of the Act are not being frustrated or ignored.
Agency decisions in the environmental area touch on fundamental
personal interests in life and health, and these interests have always
had a special claim to judicial protection.' 0
Had administrative action been requested in Grand
Canyon," would the issue have been properly ripe? The court
could have found ample authority to conclude that formalized
agency action is not a prerequisite for judicial review;42 that
agency inaction can be construed as constituting a negative EIS
determination. Given the Tenth Circuit's strict scrutiny of
agency action under NEPA, it is foreseeable that strict scrutiny
of agency inaction which frustrates NEPA's mandates will follow.
Im. CONCLUSION
Certain policies relating to the standard of review of agency
action under NEPA have been established in the Tenth Circuit.
A substantive agency decision finding a base in an adequately
developed EIS (or negative EIS determination) will be reviewed
under the arbitrary and capricious standard enunciated in the
APA. Yet the court will closely examine the EIS (or negative EIS
determination) to test whether it complies with NEPA's manda-
tory procedural requirements. Such compliance is a prerequisite
for substantive decisions. Should this approach be extended to
the issue of when administrative inaction becomes tantamount to
a negative EIS determination, the issue should necessarily in-
volve questions pertaining to NEPA's procedural requirements
and, therefore, merit strict scrutiny.
Although the Tenth Circuit has termed procedures man-
dated by NEPA something other than true agency action, and,
thus, not within the ambit of the APA, it is suggested that they
constitute true agency action and the Tenth Circuit's standard of
denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), for the proposition that the judiciary can only delay action
through NEPA. Undoubtedly, a plaintiff's best chance for success is to convince the
agency of the wisdom and correctness of his views.
481 F.2d at 1094.
" No matter how sharply the issues are drawn or how imminent the harm alleged,
there must be legislative authority for the court to review. Comment, Judicial Control of
Administrative Inaction: Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 57 VA. L.
REv. 676, 688 (1971). The opinion in Grand Canyon indicated that such authority does
not exist until some formal administrative action has occurred.
" E.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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review need not rest on this distinction. The APA provides a basis
for a broad review of issues relating to NEPA's procedural man-
dates.
Stanley L. Grazis
